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Abstract
In this study meal sharing is used as a way of quantifying food transfers 
between households. Traditional food-sharing studies measure the flow of 
resources between households. Meal sharing, in contrast, measures food con-
sumption acts according to whether one is a host or a guest in the house-
hold as well as the movement of people between households in the context 
of food consumption. Our goal is to test a number of evolutionary models of 
food transfers, but first we argue that before one tests models of who should 
receive food one must understand the adaptiveness of food transfers. For the 
Ye’kwana, economies of scale in food processing and preparation appear to 
set the stage for the utility of meal sharing. Evolutionary models of meal shar-
ing, such as kin selection and reciprocal altruism, are evaluated along with 
non-evolutionary models, such as egalitarian exchange and residential propin-
quity. In addition, a modified measure of exchange balance--proportional bal-
ance--is developed. Reciprocal altruism is shown to be the strongest predictor 
of exchange intensity and balance. 
Keywords: evolutionary ecology, exchange, food sharing, meal sharing, recip-
rocal altruism, Ye’kwana (Venezuela) 
Since 1995 a number of studies of food transfers among foragers and foraging horticulturalists have appeared (see Gurven 2004a for a review). All of these 
studies have dealt with the movement of food resources between households 
or, more recently, the movement of people between households in the context of 
meal sharing (Ziker and Schnegg 2005). Many of these studies have simultane-
ously tested multiple models of food transfers (e.g., reciprocal altruism, kin selec-
tion, costly signaling, and tolerated scrounging). More often than not, reciprocal 
altruism is found to be an important factor. We continue in this vein but employ 
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a novel way to measure food transfers: behavioral observations of meal sharing. 
Meal sharing is defined as any food consumption event where an individual is 
observed eating food in a household in which he or she is not a member. It is 
the same act in the modern context when we invite someone over for a meal. We 
examine patterns of meal sharing and find that reciprocal altruism is the stron-
gest predictor of meal sharing between households, whereas hypotheses based 
on kinship, egalitarian exchange, and tolerated scrounging (theft) fail to be sup-
ported. Finally, we attempt to address the issue of why meal exchange occurs so 
as to relate it to the “who” of exchange. That is, transfers should only occur if they 
solve some problem, such as reduction in the variance of food consumption, or 
permit an economy of scale in production. Once we know the potential utility of 
transfers we may be in a better position to make predictions about with whom 
and how many one should exchange. 
Literature on Food Transfers 
Recently, Gurven (2004a) has reviewed studies of ethnographic research on food 
transfers. Many of these studies test evolutionary explanations of food transfers, 
such as reciprocal altruism, kin selection, costly signaling, and tolerated scroung-
ing. Of them all, reciprocal altruism has the most robust support: it has been dem-
onstrated in eight different hunter-gatherer or foraging horticultural groups, and 
the number is now up to nine if we include Patton’s (2005) recent Amazonian 
research in a multi-ethnic community. This is not to suggest that a society cannot 
have multiple modes of exchange depending on food type, or that food transfers 
cannot have multiple functions depending on context. We will briefly character-
ize the evolutionary models we tested (reciprocal altruism and kin selection) as 
well as a non-evolutionary model (egalitarian exchange). Although we are unable 
to carefully evaluate costly signaling or tolerated scrounging models, an egalitar-
ian exchange model has a great deal in common with tolerated scrounging, as we 
will demonstrate. 
Tests of reciprocal altruism are based on the idea that there should be a posi-
tive correlation between what one household gives to and what it receives from 
another household. This is referred to as balance (Hames 1987) or contingency 
(Gurven et al. 2000). It is founded on a simple premise from Trivers’s (1971) 
theory of reciprocal altruism that givers and receivers should reverse posi-
tions on a systematic basis (Axelrod 1984) such that the amounts received and 
given should be correlated. One gives with the expectation that a return will be 
made in the future. It is not necessary that like be exchanged for like (e.g., meat 
for meat). Reciprocal altruism could be based on trade, a term coined to char-
acterize exchanges involving different currencies (Kaplan and Hill 1985; Win-
terhalder 1986). The standard way to test this model is to correlate the num-
ber of transfers between individuals or household dyads. As mentioned above, 
reciprocal altruism is widely supported. However, as Gurven shows (2004a:551, 
Table 2), contingency rarely accounts for more than a third of the variance in 
giving and receiving. 
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Kin selection models of exchange derive from Hamilton’s model of inclu-
sive fitness (Hamilton 1964). An individual should be willing to share an item 
of food so long as the cost is less than the benefit, times the coefficient of relat-
edness between the individuals (or C < B × r). A number of qualitative ethno-
graphic studies have argued that close kin preferentially receive more food than 
distant kin or unrelated individuals (Gurven 2004a). Quantitative studies show 
that kinship is a factor for the Hiwi (Gurven et al. 2001), in Conambo (Patton 
2005:142), and for the Ache when they are sedentary (Gurven et al. 2000) but 
not while on trek. When the Ache live in a sedentary village and depend on cul-
tivated crops, kinship plays a stronger role in exchange, and it seems to be con-
nected with reciprocity and propinquity such that kinship only becomes signif-
icant in the context of these two factors (see also Tucker’s recent research [2004] 
on the Mikea of Madagascar). 
In a paper on Yanomamö food exchange, Hames (2000) operationalized a 
model of egalitarian exchange. This model stems from the suggestion of Sahlins 
(1972) that resource flows should go from those who have high productive capac-
ity and low relative need to those who have low productive capacity and high 
relative need. One way to capture relative household need is through calculation 
of the consumer-to-producer (C:P) ratio. Families with few adults and numerous 
children have greater C:P ratios than families with many adults and few children. 
Hence, households with high C:P ratios have greater needs because they have 
a more difficult time meeting their subsistence needs than those with low C:P 
ratios. Although one would not claim that such a model is evolutionary in formu-
lation (in Sahlins’s case it is Marxist), it is a useful model to explore given its pop-
ularity in anthropology. 
To some extent, there is an overlap between egalitarian exchange and toler-
ated scrounging models (and “demand sharing” as well [Barnard 1993; Wood-
burn 1982]) such that one’s current need as measured by the C:P ratio will induce 
others with more favorable C:P ratios to share. In addition, large households, 
irrespective of their C:P ratios, may be able to coerce smaller households into 
meal sharing as a simple function of their size. We also test this model. In the 
first quantitative test of the egalitarian exchange model, Aspelin (1979) studied 
food distributions among the Maimande, a foraging horticultural group in Brazil, 
and presented data showing that food moved between households based on rela-
tive need. In contrast, Hames (2000) demonstrated that C:P ratios did not predict 
patterns of food exchange among the Yanomamö. We test for the possibility of 
tolerated scrounging by examining the relationship among meal sharing, house-
hold size, and propinquity. Following several others (e.g., Patton 2005:140) we 
reason that close neighbors are less able to hide food preparation activities from 
each other than households who live farther apart. Thus, those who are in need 
are more likely to make successful demands, and large households may be able 
to intimidate smaller households. Nevertheless, we feel that propinquity may 
also play a role in kin selection and reciprocal altruism since it lowers the costs of 
transfer between cooperators. 
Finally, according to costly signaling theory, resources that are difficult to 
acquire because their acquisition depends on superior skill, strength, or endur-
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ance may be transferred in order to demonstrate the phenotypic quality of the 
acquirer. Individuals who efficiently acquire such resources may be sought after 
as mates or allies (Hawkes 1991; Smith and Bliege Bird 2000). While it is true that 
acquisition of large game is avidly pursued by the Ye’kwana, we will not con-
sider this model because acquisition of the vast majority of food resources shared 
at meals (i.e., garden food) requires skills and efforts that are not subject to much 
variation in productive abilities. Given the limitations in our data we only test 
models of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, egalitarian meal sharing, and, to 
some extent, tolerated scrounging. 
The “Why” of Sharing 
The models described above attempt to account for the patterning of food trans-
fers: who gets and who gives, how often, and what the relationship is between 
giver and receiver. With the exception of costly signaling and tolerated scroung-
ing, they do not, however, explain why exchange occurs in the first place, and 
how this explanation may influence the patterning of exchange. For costly sig-
naling, exchange occurs because it permits the procurer to demonstrate his 
phenotypic qualities. In tolerated scrounging, transfers occur because receiv-
ers are in a stronger position to coerce food from possessors. Costly signaling 
models don’t clearly specify who is to receive, whereas tolerated scrounging 
models predict that transfers will go to those who can dominate or intimidate 
because of their greater need. Most ordinary, interhousehold exchange may 
occur because it solves problems caused by the nature of food procurement and 
processing methods (Smith 2003:409). We would argue that researchers need to 
understand the utility of sharing (“why”) before positing various evolutionary 
models (e.g., reciprocal altruism or kin selection) that deal with the patterning 
of exchange (“who”) (see also Gurven 2004b:578). Tucker’s work (2004:58-60) is 
an excellent example of integrating the “why” and “who” of exchange by show-
ing how synchrony in acquisition and resource package size, both of which pre-
dict variance reduction, have implications for tolerated scrounging and reci-
procity. What follows is a consideration of some “why” theories of the adap-
tiveness of exchange. 
Variance in foraging success is commonly employed to explain the adap-
tiveness of exchange in relation to large-game sharing. Numerous ethnogra-
phers have shown that hunting is a high variance subsistence pursuit. Hunt-
ers may fail to bring anything home more than half of the time, and when they 
do succeed, package size may range from a few kilograms to several hundred 
kilograms of game. Kaplan and Hill (1985) have empirically demonstrated that 
hunting failure rates leading to high variance in success were a significant prob-
lem in achieving caloric sufficiency. For the Ache they showed that pooling 
(sharing) resources solves this problem: under conditions of game pooling the 
Ache had a daily caloric insufficiency only 3% of the time compared with 27% 
without sharing. This may be a very general explanation of sharing when there 
is high variance in hunting success and game is not synchronously acquired. 
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Winterhalder (1986) provided an extended mathematical analysis showing that 
pooling among no more than six hunters, in most cases, was sufficient to reduce 
variance in success to acceptable levels. In addition, Sugiyama and Chacon 
(2000) showed that the number of hunters necessary to reduce risk through 
pooling would have to be revised slightly upward to deal with frequent inca-
pacitations (injury or illness) that reduce the pool of active hunters. Although 
variance reduction is probably a general mechanism for the sharing of large 
packages that are asynchronously acquired (but see Bliege Bird et al. 2002 for 
a negative instance), it provides little insight into the sharing of low-variance 
resources (many gathered, gardened, and fished resources) so common among 
the Ye’kwana and many other subsistence producers. 
In other instances cooperative procurement (e.g., Pygmy net hunting or Inuit 
caribou drives) leads to sharing (Smith 1992). A number of studies (e.g., Alvard 
and Nolin 2002) have demonstrated that individuals who forage cooperatively 
share in the catch even if they were not the ones to acquire the resource directly. 
Another way in which cooperative procurement may lead to sharing was sug-
gested by Hames (1990) when he noted that the location of certain gathered 
resources that are perennially available (e.g., wild palm fruit) is widely known by 
village members. In a sense, such resources are held in common, and these pre-
dictable resources can be procured by anyone who takes the time to gather them. 
Given relatively high fixed costs in transit time, it is more efficient for a few to 
harvest these resources serially and distribute them to co-villagers. This kind of 
coordinated procurement also prevents foraging overlap so individuals do not 
travel to the same patch only to find the resource has been taken. 
A number of researchers (Gurven et al. 2001; Kaplan et al. 1990:137-138; 
Tucker 2004) suggest that economies of scale in agricultural food preparation may 
be key to understanding the adaptiveness of exchange for those food resources. 
By economy of scale we mean that the average per unit cost of producing an item 
falls or the yield increases (up to a point of eventual diminishing returns) as the 
number of producers increases (Smith 1992, 2003:410, Figure 21.2) such that the 
overall efficiency of production (or rate of return) is increased. We believe that 
economies of scale in manioc harvest and food preparation may be the reason 
for meal sharing among the Ye’kwana. Although only 54% of Ye’kwana shared 
meals were coded as consisting of garden food, this figure represents a coding 
decision that does not reflect the full complexity of Ye’kwana meals. Whenever 
a person was observed eating, the kind of food actually in a person’s mouth or 
hands was recorded and what was on his or her plate was ignored. The Ye’kwana 
have a cultural rule that mandates that if someone is given fish or game at a meal 
they are also always given casabe. The Ye’kwana believe that it is improper for 
anyone to consume fish, invertebrates (e.g., crabs, termites, or wasp larvae), or 
game without consuming casabe. Although most fruits and vegetables may be 
given and consumed without casabe, some calorically dense fruits which the 
Ye’kwana associate with meat, such as Brazil nuts (Bertholletia excelsa) and avo-
cado (Persea americana), are always given with casabe. Since casabe is a compo-
nent of nearly all meals, meal sharing to a large extent revolves around the con-
sumption of casabe. 
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A consideration of manioc preparation illustrates why frequent recipro-
cal exchanges from a limited number of cooperators may be the best model to 
account for Ye’kwana meal sharing. Manioc preparation in the form of casabe 
(flat cakes) or other products (farina and tapioca starch) is very time consuming, 
and the Ye’kwana like to eat these foods on the day they are prepared. Travel 
to the gardens requires a substantial fixed cost (at least one hour). Women 
(between the ages of 17 and 50) spend an average of 56 minutes per day har-
vesting (Hames 1978:234, Table V-5). After harvesting, roots must be peeled, 
soaked and/or grated, squeezed, sifted, and then baked. The fixed cost of man-
ioc preparation is relatively high and constant, and similar costs must be paid 
whether one is preparing a few or many kilograms of the product. For exam-
ple, manioc is squeezed in a long (1.4–1.8 m) basket sleeve called a sebucan. 
Squeezing time is about the same whether one is squeezing a full load (6-8 kg) 
or a smaller load. Given the set-up and elaborate stages of processing we feel 
that making a large batch is considerably more efficient (in terms of kilograms 
of prepared product per unit of effort) than making a small amount for fam-
ily consumption. On average, Ye’kwana women (ages 17-50) spend 1.3 hr/day 
in manioc preparation (Hames 1978:325, Table VI-2). After harvesting and food 
preparation costs are combined, Ye’kwana women spend 2.23 hr/day in man-
ioc production. This expenditure of labor represents 27% of a woman’s daily 
labor time. Reciprocal food preparation may be significantly reducing casabe 
preparation time to this level. Alternatively, Michael Gurven (personal commu-
nication 2005) suggests that high and fixed travel costs to distant gardens may 
factor into an economy of scale, along with processing costs. We agree that this 
may be true in villages with distant gardens, but we believe that high process-
ing costs are a chronic problem. 
Finally, it seems to us that the sharing of meals may have some interest-
ing sociopsychological dimensions that differentiate it from ordinary food 
exchange. There are several ways in which food moves between households. 
Ordinarily a young child from one household will deliver food to another 
household, usually garden or gathered foods. When large game is captured, the 
household that acquired it butchers it outdoors while male or female house-
hold heads wait to receive shares. Sometimes it is cooked before distribution. 
The same may apply to someone who has landed a large haul of fish. In these 
cases the air is festive, collective, and congenial as receivers contemplate a rich 
meal. They are public events, in contrast to the quiet, private transfers of vege-
table resources. Likewise, meal sharing is a private event that takes place within 
households. Clearly all households could simply transfer food to other house-
holds without going through the formality of inviting them to share a meal. 
Meal sharing probably marks an important type of relationship that is inten-
sified by the private sharing of meals. Perhaps the feeling of indebtedness and 
need to make a return are intensified as one eats with the providers in their 
house. It may also may serve to intensify a preexisting social relationship, much 
as it does in our own culture. 
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Ethnographic Background 
The Ye’kwana, also known as the Makiritare, are Carib-speaking horticultural-
ists inhabiting about 30,000 km2 of the Estado Amazonas in Venezuela, distrib-
uted in 30 villages with a total population of approximately 1,600. Village size 
ranges from 7 to 193 with a mode of 50 (Arvelo-Jiménez 1971). Most villages are 
located in the mid to upper reaches of major tributaries of the Upper Orinoco 
River. Research took place in the village of Toki (or Toki’fia) located on the lower 
middle course of the Padamo River. This river basin serves as a frontier sepa-
rating the southwesternmost extent of the Yanomamö population and the south-
easternmost extent of the Ye’kwana population. On the Padamo there are eight 
Yanomamö and three Ye’kwana villages within a day’s motorized canoe trip 
from Toki. The village itself contains 88 full-time Ye’kwana residents, a number 
of Yanomamö associated with some of the Ye’kwana households, and two satel-
lite Yanomamö villages with a combined population of 36. 
Nuclear and joint households are the most important social and economic 
groups in a Ye’kwana village. They are the basic units of production, exchange, 
and consumption. Nuclear and joint households represent different stages of a 
basic domestic cycle. Joint households consist of the senior founding members, 
their subadult children, and one or more junior nuclear families of matrilocally 
married daughters. Junior families split from the larger joint family as their chil-
dren age. Eventually, daughters in the newly formed household will attract hus-
bands, and a new joint family will be produced. All households, whether joint or 
stem, have their own gardens which supply 75-80% of all daily calories. The bal-
ance is supplied by hunted, gathered, and fished resources. Less than five percent 
of food consumed is non-locally produced (Hames 1978). 
Two published studies deal quantitatively with exchange of services, but not 
resources, between households. The first concerns garden labor exchange among 
the Ye’kwana (Hames 1987). In the creation of gardens, land is cleared jointly by 
groups of men on a serial basis. The tasks of weeding, planting, and harvesting 
are cooperatively performed by groups of women. For men, 48% of all garden 
labor was allocated to gardens other than their own, whereas for women it was 
26% (Hames 1987:267, Table 2). Garden labor exchange was significantly corre-
lated with household relatedness; closely related households engaged in higher 
frequencies of exchange (referred to as exchange intensity) than distantly related 
households. In addition, closely related households had greater imbalances of 
exchange (one of the pair gave much more labor to the other than it received in 
return) than distantly related households, which tended to have more balanced 
exchange relationships. Another study (Hames 1988) examined alloparental care 
of infants and toddlers and found that the amount of time a woman spent caring 
for (holding, feeding, grooming, and comforting) a child was determined by her 
relatedness to the child. As will be demonstrated below, relatedness, despite its 
documented importance in garden labor exchange and childcare, is not a signifi-
cant factor in meal sharing. 
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Methods 
Quantitative studies have measured food transfers in several ways. The first 
involves the direct observation of weighed food portions (e.g., Kaplan et al. 1984; 
Hames 1990). In these studies the procurer of the resource, its edible weight, and 
the amounts and proportions distributed to other households are recorded. In 
some cases, secondary distributions are also recorded (Guven et al. 2000). A sec-
ond method, pioneered by Kaplan and colleagues (1984; also see Hames 1996; 
Gurven et al. 2000), involves the use of instantaneous scan sampling. Whenever 
a person is observed eating, the researcher notes the item consumed and asks the 
consumer who provided the food. From such records the analyst can calculate 
the frequency that individuals were observed consuming foods given to them by 
other individuals or households. Finally, other researchers (e.g., Patton 2005) use 
a variety of interview protocols in which receiving households are asked to rank 
the frequency with which other households or individuals in a settlement trans-
ferred food resources to them. 
The method used to document food transfers in this study is a variant of the 
scan sampling technique. In the course of collecting time allocation data on eco-
nomic and other behaviors, Hames noted the date, time, and location as well as 
the individual’s behavior. In the data set used here, each record was a location-
ally differentiated observation of a person consuming an item of food. When an 
individual was observed eating in a household other than his or her own, this 
instance was scored as meal sharing. With these data we produced a series of 
matrices quantifying the number of times members of different families were 
observed eating in their own or in one of the seven other households in the vil-
lage. If three members of a particular household were observed eating in another 
household, this was counted as three observations of meal sharing. This method is 
identical to the one used to measure garden labor exchange among the Ye’kwana 
(Hames 1987). There Hames noted the number of times an individual worked in 
his own household’s gardens compared with other household’s gardens. 
Feeding guests in one’s house provides a benefit to them at some cost to mem-
bers of the host household. One could argue that this is not always the case if the 
guest had provided the host with food (e.g., American potluck dinners). How-
ever, the Ye’kwana do not bring food to other households, and they expect to be 
fed immediately upon arrival. We know from experience that guests were occa-
sionally fed meals based in part on resources they had previously donated to the 
household. Nevertheless, the host household retains full control over its food 
resources and independently decides whom to provide with meals. In nearly all 
cases, guests were invited for the express purpose of sharing a meal, and they 
were not fed simply because they happened to visit. This method underestimates 
the actual intensity of sharing (defined by Hames [1990, 2000] as the amount of 
food a household consumed that was produced by another household) because 
food transferred to a household and consumed only by household members is 
not measured. 
m e a l  s H a r i n g  a m o n g  t H e  Y e ’ k w a n a      9
Statistical Description of Ye’kwana Meal Sharing 
The data presented here come from behavioral observations on residents of the 
Ye’kwana village of Toki collected in 1975-1976 over a 10-month period (Hames 
1978). A subset of these data on meal sharing were then analyzed by McCabe 
(2004). The entire behavioral and locational data base on the Ye’kwana is avail-
able online at http://www-class.unl.edu/yekmap/html/index.html . The data-
base can be queried on-line though an interface developed by McCabe, and many 
of the analyses presented here can be replicated. 
A total of 18,947 behavioral observations were made on 81 Ye’kwana residents 
of Toki (originally there were 88, but 7 had insufficient observations and were 
excluded from the dataset). Of these, 1,196 (or 6.3%) were eating observations. 
The distribution of meal types (shared or unshared) is presented in Table 1. Less 
than 5% of all meals consumed were of store-bought foods. Characterization of 
what the individual was eating at the instant they were observed is a bit prob-
lematic. When recording the data Hames used a variety of rules to determine the 
kind of meal consumed. If someone was placing or about to place food in their 
mouth, it was easy to code the general type of food (as indicated in Table 1). If the 
person was pausing or conversing during the meal, then the predominant food 
in the person’s hand, in his eating utensil, or in a serving basket was recorded. In 
actuality, most Ye’kwana meals consist of a several foods, and casabe (or other 
manioc products), as mentioned above, is by far the most common denominator 
in all meals. 
There are a number of different ways to describe the flow of resources or ser-
vices between households. They have been defined (Hames 1987, 1996, 2000) as 
intensity, scope, and balance. General giving intensity (or receiving intensity) mea-
sures the amount or proportion of a household’s total food budget that is contrib-
uted by all other households. In a sense, it is a measure of subsidy from the entire 
settlement. Specific giving intensity is the amount or proportion of meals given to 
a household from those who do not live in the household where the eating event 
occurred. Therefore, specific intensity measures how much a household gave to 
or received from another household. As Table 1 shows, 23% of meals were con-
sumed in households other than the consumer’s household.   
Table 1. Intensity of Meal Sharing among Households: Frequency of Shared and Unshared 
Meals by Resource Type 
            Resource Type 
 Hunted  Gathered  Gardened  Fished  Store-Bought  Total 
Unshared  81%  80%  76%  77%  57%  77% 
(n)  (218)  (127)  (477)  (65)  (32)  (919) 
Shared  19%  20%  24%  23%  43%  23% 
(n)  (51)  (33)  (149)  (19)  (25)  (277) 
Total (n)  269  160  626  84  57  1,196
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Scope measures the number of households with whom a focal household 
shares, irrespective of how many meals were shared. In Toki, the scope of shar-
ing ranges from 1 to 7 with a mean of 4.13 (Table 2). This means that on average a 
household was observed to share meals with about four of the seven other house-
holds in the village. An average household gave meals 7.8 times to other house-
hold members during the 10-month sampling period. Five of the eight house-
holds did not share meals with members of half of the other households in the 
village during the sampling period. This does not necessarily mean that they did 
not transfer food; rather, no member of the other households was observed eating 
within the confines of their household. 
Balance, like intensity, can be viewed generally or specifically. Specific balance 
in meal sharing is the difference, positive or negative, between household dyads 
in terms of what was given to and received from another household. General bal-
ance is the sum of meals given to all non-household members less the sum of 
meals received from all other households. Figure 1 is a histogram of specific bal-
ance between all unique household dyads. Mean specific balance is 2.48, which 
means that the average household is receiving about two and a half more meals 
than it is returning. The mode is zero, indicating perfect balance. In all six cases 
of perfect balance there was no meal sharing between the household dyads. Some 
measures of exchange are informative tests of the various models whereas others 
simply provide descriptive context. A model of reciprocal altruism can be tested 
by correlating specific giving and receiving intensity between unique household 
dyads: if household A gives a substantial amount to household B, then house-
hold B should reciprocate by giving a similar amount to household A. However, 
since household size varies considerably and there are a relatively small number 
of meal events, we feel that measuring giving and receiving as a percentage of all 
such acts represents a more reliable test of reciprocal altruism.   
Table 2. Scope of Exchange or Number of Households with Whom Each Household 
Exchanged, and Number of Meals Shared 
   Average Count of Meals 
Household ID  Giving Scope  Giving Intensity  Given to each Household 
1  4  6  1.5 
2 3  12  4.0 
3  7  78  11.1 
4  6  91  15.2 
5  3  13  4.3 
6  1  2  2.0 
7  3  4  1.3 
8  3  71  23.7 
Mean  4.13  34.6  7.8 
s.d.  2.03  38.1  7.6  
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If reciprocal altruism governs exchange relations between households, one 
would also expect that exchange events between household dyads should be cor-
related. If they were not, then one household could be seen as exploiting the other, 
a violation of reciprocal altruism. As others have noted (e.g., Allen-Arave et al., in 
press), however, this assumes that costs and benefits are symmetric through time 
or for each member of the exchange dyad. This is not always true, since costs of 
production and benefits of consumption can vary for each dyad as a consequence 
of situational factors. Given the limitations of the data and the possibility that 
reciprocation can occur through trade, we are hesitant to claim that balance is a 
strong test of reciprocal altruism. In contrast to meal sharing, trade occurs when 
different currencies are exchanged (Kaplan and Gurven 2005; Marlowe 2004). For 
example, one could reciprocate a meal with a food transfer or with labor assis-
tance. Nevertheless, we feel that balance is an important concept, and we would 
expect that households that engage in high levels of exchange should have more 
balanced meal-sharing relationships than households that do not. 
To analyze balance more accurately, we developed a method of calculating 
balance between households that attempts to control for the volume of exchange 
between households. When the volume of exchange across household dyads 
varies greatly, households with a lower total volume of exchange will almost 
invariably appear to be more balanced than those with a higher total volume 
of exchange. Hypothetical data in Table 3 depict this problem and its solution 
through a measure we call proportional balance. 
Figure 1. Histogram of specific exchange balance between all dyads.    
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The standard balance measurement seems to show that dyad A:B exhibits the 
most balanced exchange whereas E:F exhibits the least balanced exchange. How-
ever, the volume of exchange is more than ten times greater in E:F than in A:B, 
while the balance figure is less than five times greater. Proportional balance nor-
malizes the measurement of balance based on exchange volume and expresses 
the difference between the amounts given and received as a fraction of the total 
volume of exchange between two households. This results in a closed interval 
of values from -1 to +1. A value of 0 signifies perfect balance, and other values 
(positive or negative) signify imbalance. A negative value signifies that the focal 
household gave less than it received and a positive sign signifies that it gave more 
than it received. 
In egalitarian exchange one would expect that households who have a diffi-
cult time meeting consumer demand because of having a high consumer-to-pro-
ducer (C:P) ratio should have high levels of receiving intensity and correspond-
ingly low levels of giving intensity. Therefore, C:P ratios should correlate neg-
atively with general and specific giving intensity and positively with receiving 
intensity. In addition, households with high C:P ratios should exhibit high nega-
tive balances (they should receive more than they give). 
For kin selection models to be supported there should be positive correla-
tions between relatedness and specific and general giving and receiving inten-
sity. That is, close kin should both give more to each other than to distant kin and 
receive more. We also predict that close kin should tolerate relatively high lev-
els of imbalance in exchange, a pattern documented in Ye’kwana garden labor 
exchange (Hames 1987). 
Analytic Procedures 
To test various models of exchange we generated a series of sharing matrices that 
display how much each household gave and received meals from all other house-
holds in the village and the degree to which households are in balance. These 
distributions of meal transfers were then associated with measures of household 
relatedness, consumer-to-producer ratios, and household propinquity. 
Given the nature of Ye’kwana households and the collaborative production 
and consumption of food, the measurement of relatedness is analytically prob-
lematic. For our purposes, relatedness between each household dyad was mea-
sured as the mean relatedness between all members of each household paired 
Table 3. Example of Balance and the Proportional Measure of Balance 
                                                                                                    Standard          Proportional 
Dyad             Given           Received                 Total               Balance                Balance 
A:B  5  7  12  –2  –0.167 
C:D  15  12  27  3  0.111 
E:F  74  83  157  –9  –0.057
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with members of every other household in the village. This produced an 8 x 8 
half matrix. This method is identical to the procedure followed by Hames in a 
study of garden labor exchange (1987; see also Ziker and Schnegg 2005). Other 
studies have measured relatedness as the closest relatedness between any two 
members of household dyads (e.g., Gurven et al. 2001). To our knowledge few 
attempts have been made (see Hames 1987 for one) to justify whether relatedness 
should be measured between families overall, as we do here, or between the two 
most closely related individuals in two families. Another feasible method would 
be to measure the relatedness between household heads. Nevertheless, we use 
mean relatedness between households here because shared resources are usually 
a joint household production effort and reflect a cost that affects all members in 
the donor household, and because several members of a receiving household typ-
ically receive the benefit of a meal simultaneously. 
Consumer-to-producer ratios were calculated using time allocation data col-
lected on the Ye’kwana (Hames 1978). Based on time allocation data a producer 
with a value of 1.0 was the mean labor time of all individuals between the ages 
of 20 and 50 years. Individuals older and younger than this span were deemed 
to be fractional producers depending on their time allocation to labor. Esti-
mates of consumption rates were based on Kaplan’s study of the Machiguenga 
(Kaplan 1994) and Kramer’s (2002) research on the Maya. These groups are sim-
ilar to the Ye’kwana in their labor time allocations, and they too subsist on hor-
ticulture and foraging. 
We also added the variables of propinquity (measured as the distance, in 
meters, between households using well-worn paths) and household size as other 
factors that may enable us to test for tolerated scrounging. The tolerated scroung-
ing model predicts that large households may have greater need and therefore 
may be successful at making demands on smaller households for food. Gurven 
and colleagues (2000:174) and Patton (2005:148) argue that a negative correlation 
between household distance and food received may be an indicator of tolerated 
scrounging. In other studies, propinquity and household size were discovered to 
be significant factors in exchange (e.g., Gurven 2006; Patton 2005). 
Results 
Below we review the results of several different evolutionary and anthropolog-
ical models of meal sharing among the Ye’kwana. Of those, reciprocal altruism 
and propinquity consistently predict the patterning of meal sharing among the 
Ye’kwana whereas kin selection, tolerated scrounging, and egalitarian exchange 
do not. Unless otherwise indicated, tests are two-tailed. 
Egalitarian Exchange 
As noted, the ratio of consumers to producers in a household is a reasonable 
measure of household need in that it provides an index of how hard a house-
hold must work in order to meet subsistence requirements. As the number of 
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consumers increases relative to producers, meeting all members’ consump-
tion requirements becomes more difficult. As noted earlier, egalitarian exchange 
and tolerated scrounging models are broadly similar in that households with 
high C:P ratios would be more motivated to demand resources because of the 
aforementioned difficulty in meeting household demand. We found no correla-
tion between C:P and specific giving intensity (r = -0.059, p = 0.334, n = 56), spe-
cific receiving intensity (r = –0.125, p = 0.180, n = 56), general giving intensity (r 
=-0.098, p = 0.408, n = 8), or general receiving intensity (r =-0.521, p = 0.093, n = 8). 
Of note is a near-significant correlation between general receiving intensity and 
C:P ratio. Unexpectedly, the correlation is in the opposite direction: households 
with high consumer-to-producer ratios receive fewer meals than households with 
low consumer-to-producer ratios. 
Kin Selection 
In general, kin selection models predict that the more closely any two house-
holds are related, the greater the intensity of exchange. One might also predict 
that closely related households would permit greater imbalances in exchange, 
a pattern that was demonstrated in Ye’kwana garden labor exchange (Hames 
1987). Presumably, the inclusive fitness of a closely related household would 
be enhanced if it was able to provide a more or less sustained one-way flow of 
resources to its to needy kin. In such a situation, marginal gains in inclusive fit-
ness would partially compensate for a lack of reciprocation. However, we found 
that relatedness between households did not correlate with specific giving inten-
sity (r = 0.003, p = 0.492, n = 56), receiving intensity (r = 0.003, p = –0.985), or pro-
portional giving intensity (r = –0.041, p = 0.308, n = 56). Likewise, there was no 
correlation between relatedness and specific balance in exchange (r = 0.090, p = 
–0.325, n = 28). 
Reciprocal Altruism 
Most measures in the meal-sharing data provided reasonable levels of support 
for reciprocal altruism. As Figure 2 shows, there was a strong correlation between 
proportions given and received (r = 0.458, p = 0.01, n = 27). Although the num-
bers of meals that one household gave to another and received in return (spe-
cific intensity) were positively correlated (r = 0.345, p = 0.078, n = 27), the corre-
lation was not statistically significant (one-tailed test). As mentioned earlier, we 
cannot correlate specific balance with giving or receiving intensity because the 
more one exchanges with another, the greater the likelihood that specific balance 
will increase. Proportional balance was positively associated with specific giv-
ing intensity (r = 0.431, p = 0.025) but uncorrelated with receiving intensity (r = 
–0.241, p = 0.225). At the same time, proportional balance was uncorrelated with 
proportion given (r = 0.075, p = 0.582) but was strongly correlated with propor-
tion received (r = –0395, p = 0.003). The relation between balance and intensity of 
exchange, although significant in some cases, is not as predicted and will be dis-
cussed below.   
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Propinquity There is a significantly negative correlation between distance 
between households and giving intensity (r = -0.389, p = 0.008, n = 56) as well as 
specific receiving intensity. Propinquity also correlates negatively with propor-
tion received (r = -0.365, p = 0.006) and only marginally with proportion given (r 
= -0.253, p = 0.06). We should like to emphasize that propinquity per se probably 
does not lead to increased levels of sharing (see also Gurven et al. 2001:289 on the 
Hiwi and settled Ache). Rather, households that plan to engage in frequent meal 
sharing either decide to remain in the same area of the village or move closer to 
one another. Distance between households ranges from about 20 m to nearly 400 
m. It seems reasonable that households that plan to share meals frequently would 
desire to minimize the distance between households with whom they habitu-
ally share. As expected, relatedness and propinquity are negatively correlated (r 
= -0.515, p = 0.000, n = 26). This means that relatives live near one another but, 
as noted above, kinship and meal sharing are uncorrelated. This is a surprising 
result. 
Household Size 
Having failed to find a correlation between C:P ratios and giving and receiving 
intensity, as would be predicted by an egalitarian model of sharing, we decided 
to examine the relationship between household size and giving and receiving 
intensity. This may be deducible from a tolerated scrounging perspective: large 
households would be in a superior position to demand resources from smaller 
Figure 2. Proportional giving and receiving.   
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households because they have greater needs and their superior size may allow 
them to coerce resources from smaller households. There is a highly significant 
positive relationship between household size and general giving intensity: larger 
households give or share meals more frequently than smaller households (r = 
0.550, p < 0.000, n = 8). But there is no correlation between receiving intensity 
and household size (r = 0.004, p = 0.974, n = 8). These findings are just the oppo-
site of what one would predict using a tolerated scrounging model. These rela-
tionships are inexplicable as well as interesting. In an earlier analysis of Yano-
mamö food exchange, Hames (2000:405, Table 18.2) documented a positive cor-
relation between household size and general receiving intensity but not giving 
intensity—just the opposite of what we find here. For sedentary Ache, Gurven et 
al. (2001:289, Table 6) found a positive correlation between family size and spe-
cific giving intensity, mirroring what is found here. For the Hiwi, Gurven and col-
leagues (2000:198) found a positive correlation between family size and amount 
of food received and, apparently, given (Gurven et al. 2000:207–208). Initially we 
thought that members of large households would more frequently be recorded 
eating meals in other households simply because of their greater numbers. Not 
only was this not true but, as mentioned above, large households were more fre-
quent givers of meals to other households. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Given that propinquity between households and proportion given were sig-
nificant predictors of proportion of meals received, we performed a multivari-
ate analysis using propinquity and proportion given as independent vari-
ables and proportion received as the dependent variable. In this model propin-
quity dropped out as a significant predictor (p = 0.201) whereas proportion given 
remained as a significant predictor of proportion received (p = 0.015). 
Discussion 
The evidence for reciprocal altruism as a key feature in patterns of meal sharing 
among the Ye’kwana is shown by a correlation between proportion given and 
received between household dyads. Although propinquity was initially signif-
icantly correlated, it dropped out as a significant factor of proportion received 
when proportion given is taken into consideration. Models of kin selection, egal-
itarian exchange, and tolerated scrounging received no support. We feel there 
is a simple theoretical reason why reciprocal altruism determines meal sharing. 
The key problem in reciprocal exchanges is the length of time between an initial 
act of sharing and the return or reciprocation. For resources that are infrequently 
acquired, this delay can reduce the value of the reciprocation and/or make it 
difficult for people to keep track of what is owed (Bliege Bird et al. 2002:316). 
Meals centered on agricultural resources are daily events, and failure to recip-
rocate can rarely be excused as poor luck in harvesting garden food or lack of 
time for food preparation. The condition of one’s gardens is public knowledge or 
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is easily ascertained: thus there is no opportunity to deceive about the ability to 
return a meal. For the most part, meal production is a simple application of effort. 
The only exception to this generalization would be garden failure (Hames 1987), 
something easily ascertained. 
We predicted that the relationship between intensity and balance would lead 
to balance between households who frequently engaged in exchange. This is a 
reasonable deduction from the tit-for-tat nature of reciprocal altruism. That is, 
the proportional balance between households should have values approaching 
zero, or perfect balance, as the intensity or proportional intensity of exchange 
increased. Instead we have a pattern in which the more one gives to a particu-
lar household, the more likely it is that one’s proportional balance is positive (r 
= 0.43, p = 0.025; Figure 3). This means that meals shared by households are not 
being reciprocated, at least not with meals. An opposite but non-significant trend 
(r = -0.272, p = 0.172) is found in the correlation between proportion received and 
proportional balance. That is, the more you receive, the more negatively balanced 
you become. This pattern clearly violates our expectations regarding reciprocal 
altruism. It is possible that trade may explain this anomaly. That is, shared meals 
at households that consistently give more than they receive from other house-
holds are being reciprocated in other ways, leading to economic specialization 
between households. If so, then lack of balance in meal sharing does not invali-
date reciprocal altruism (Guven 2004a). 
The relationship between household size and giving intensity (larger house-
holds share more meals with other households than do smaller households) is 
curious, and we have no theoretical explanation for it. Initially, we thought that 
large households might share more meals simply because they have more social 
ties and therefore attract more visitors, and that members of large households 
eat more frequently in other households for the same reason. Although the for-
mer is true, the latter is not (detailed above): members of large households do not 
receive more meals than members of small households. To better contextualize 
this pattern we examined the relationship between household size and the fre-
quency that non-household members visited a household (visitors received) and 
the number of times household members visited other households (visits made) 
when visits were for purposes other than meal sharing. The correlation between 
household size and number of visitors received is quite strong (r = 0.911) and 
significant (p < 0.002). This relationship is stronger than the correlation between 
household size and giving intensity (r = 0.550, p < 0.001). However, there is a 
strong positive correlation between household size and the frequency with which 
its members visited other households (r = 0.873, p = 005); yet, as noted above, 
large households were not given more meals than small households. It is clear 
that large households received more visitors than small households and visited 
other households more frequently than small households. Nevertheless, more 
frequent visiting did not lead to greater frequencies of meal sharing for members 
of large households. 
We have presented some plausibility arguments that economies of scale are 
at work, but we have presented no data that could test such a hypothesis. If the 
hypothesis of an economy of scale in manioc preparation is true, households 
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should be closely coordinating their meal-sharing arrangements. Turn-taking as 
an adaptation to reduce total labor in food preparation would only make sense if 
meal sharing alternated between households In other words, household A should 
provide meals to household B on one day, and B should reciprocate shortly there-
after. Furthermore, we should have no or few instances of A giving a meal to B 
on the same day that B gave a meal to A. One way to assess this hypothesis is 
to examine exchange between households over time. If coordinated economies 
of scale are working, we should find regular, back-and-forth sharing between 
households. This analysis is currently underway.  
The finding that garden labor exchange and alloparental care among the 
Ye’kwana follow predictions from kin selection theory (Hames 1987, 1988) 
whereas meal exchanges follow a reciprocal altruism pattern suggests that a 
variety of mechanisms are being employed to regulate the flow of goods and 
services between households. Since food production activities such as garden 
labor exchange are intimately related to consumption events, one might pre-
dict that they would follow the same pattern. However, garden labor exchange 
is a complex phenomenon and seems to follow different patterns for men and 
women. Men reciprocally help each other clear forest for gardens in a serial pat-
tern. All join in teams to clear a particular person’s plot and then move on to 
the next plot until all are completed, a process that normally takes about six 
weeks. The activity is public, ritualized (workers are called together by a conch 
shell), competitive, raucous, and formal (workers are feted by the garden own-
ers after clearing is completed). Women, on the other hand, exchange garden 
labor throughout the year and do so in smaller, private groups without fanfare 
Figure 3. Proportional balance and giving intensity.
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or formality. The goal of the entire process appears to be a mechanism to pro-
vide insurance in case of family garden failure. That is, if a household’s gar-
dens fail or underproduce, one can make a claim of support from those that one 
assisted. Kin may be recruited in labor exchanges because helping a household 
with an inadequate food supply will probably mean that the assisting house-
hold will incur the considerable cost of decreased caloric intake. Kinship bonds 
may be the most durable and reliable mechanism to sustain such a cost. Fur-
thermore, the Ye’kwana spread this obligation by working in many different 
gardens owned by close and distant kin. Consequently there will be a large 
pool of people who could assist in case of a garden failure. In contrast, failure 
to reciprocate in meal sharing may only mean an increase in labor time (assum-
ing the economy of scale argument in food preparation is correct). Be that as it 
may, these considerations clearly suggest that the flow of goods and services 
between households may be governed by several mechanisms. 
Conclusion 
Even though nearly 25% of all meals the Ye’kwana consume are provided by 
other households and our analysis suggests that to some extent reciprocal altru-
ism governs these exchanges, we feel that meal sharing may not be intelligible 
without reference to the entire web of exchanges that occur in Ye’kwana society. 
As noted above, garden labor and childcare are governed by kinship. Other col-
laborative activities such as house and canoe construction are common, as well as 
food transfers between households from hunting, fishing, gardening, and gath-
ering. Trade may underlie reciprocal altruism given the multiple ways in which 
individuals assist one another. More to the point, we feel that future researchers 
need to focus on all relevant exchanges of resources and services in their evalua-
tion of evolutionary models of exchange. This will undoubtedly prove to be a dif-
ficult task, requiring refined methods and a broader consideration of giving and 
receiving and relevant time periods. 
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